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Abstract
This paper examines the interactions between multiple national scal policy-
makers and a single monetary policy maker in response to shocks to govern-
ment debt in some or all of the countries of a monetary union. We assume that
national governments respond to excess debt in an optimal manner, but that
they do not have access to a commitment technology. This implies that national
scal policy gradually reduces debt: the lack of a commitment technology pre-
cludes a random walk in steady state debt, but the need to maintain national
competitiveness avoids excessively rapid debt reduction. If the central bank can
commit, it adjusts its policies only slightly in response to higher debt, allowing
national scal policy to undertake most of the adjustment. However if it cannot
commit, then optimal monetary policy involves using interest rates to rapidly
reduce debt, with signicant welfare costs. We show that in these circumstances
the central bank would do better to ignore national scal policies in formulating
its policy.
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1 Overview
What is the optimal response of the European Central Banks (ECB) monetary
policy to a positive shock to government debt in its member countries? This
will depend on how national scal policy responds to its own excess debt, which
we show is likely to be quite di¤erent to how it would respond outside of a
monetary union. We analyse a multi-country monetary union where national
scal authorities operate in the national interest and do not have access to
a commitment technology. This alters the analysis of optimal monetary and
time-consistent scal policy in closed economies in various respects. First, an
e¤ective means of inuencing debt levels in the closed economy (or in the open
economy under exible exchange rates) is to introduce ination surprises under
exible prices, or to reduce real debt service costs under sticky prices. Within
a monetary union national policy makers no longer have access to monetary
policy to achieve this, and any ination consequences of changes in distortionary
taxes will have repercussions on competitiveness with respect to the rest of the
monetary union and will ultimately have to be undone. Thus the extent of
the time-inconsistency problem can be quite di¤erent in the monetary union,
relative to the closed economy. Secondly, while the national scal authorities are
assumed to be too small to interact strategically with each other or the European
Central Bank (ECB), the ECB could reasonably be thought to be aware of how
national scal authorities might react to union-wide economic conditions and
may or may not choose to factor this into their optimal policies. We therefore
explore how time-consistent national scal policies inuence ECB behaviour,
after allowing for varying degrees of ECB conservatism, ECB mandates and
whether or not the ECB can commit. We show that even when national scal
policies are sound and collectively stabilise union-wide debt stocks, the ECB
faces a signicant temptation to adjust monetary policy to facilitate national
scal adjustment and this time-inconsistency problem can be particularly costly
in welfare terms.
In terms of modelling, we follow Gali and Monacelli (2008) in considering the
case of monetary union consisting of a continuum of small economies, although
we extend GMs analysis to include a labour income tax, in addition to gov-
ernment spending, as a national scal instrument. More signicantly, we also
focus on the need to satisfy national government budget constraints through
adjustments in distortionary taxes and/or government spending conditional on
the monetary policies pursued by the ECB.1 We assume that national scal au-
thorities seek to maximise national welfare, taking the ECBs monetary policy
and the state of the rest of the union as given. Additionally, we assume that the
national scal authorities do not have access to a commitment technology such
that their national scal policies are constrained to be time-consistent. The re-
sultant optimal national policies successfully stabilise national government debt
gradually through a combination of government spending cuts and tax rises,
which are carefully balanced to mitigate the costs of lost competitiveness rel-
1GM assume that national governments have access to a lump-sum tax at all points in
time such that government debt does not play any part in their analysis.
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ative to the rest of the monetary union during the period of scal correction.
The fact that national scal authorities care about competitiveness vis a vis the
rest of the monetary union, also implies that increasing price exibility signi-
cantly slows the speed of debt correction - this is in contrast to the case of the
closed economy or open economy operating under exible exchange rates where
increasing price exibility allows ination surprises to be used to stabilise debt
more rapidly.
We then turn to consider the optimal policies of the ECB, where the ECB
cares about an aggregate of utility functions across the monetary union, in the
light of the aggregate impact of the national scal policies. Since the national
scal authorities are solely concerned with national welfare and take condi-
tions in the rest of the union as given, there is scope for the ECB to act as
a Stackelberg leader and take account of the collective national scal response
to its policies. If the ECB can commit then it moderates its monetary policies
slightly to reduce union-wide debt levels, but the bulk of the adjustment takes
place through national scal adjustment. However, such a policy is inherently
time-inconsistent: the ECB is resisting the temptation to introduce a policy
surprise to reduce union-wide debt levels and partially avoid the costly national
scal adjustments that would otherwise take place. When the ECB is assumed
not to have access to a commitment technology, then its policy response to a
union-wide debt shock is quite di¤erent. Although the national scal authorities
follow policies which stabilise national (and therefore, collectively, union-wide)
government debt stocks, the ECB runs a time-consistent policy which aggres-
sively returns union-wide debt to its steady-state value by reducing debt service
costs, boosting the union-wide tax base and encouraging national scal author-
ities to cut government spending.
As an alternative description of ECB policy, we assume that the ECB seeks
to maximise union-wide welfare but does not recognise national scal policies
and the national budget constraints as constraints on its policy problem. In
other words we allow the ECB to simply ignore the scal repercussions of its
actions, and therefore its ability to both inuence government debt and also the
attendant national scal responses. Since the national scal policies are essen-
tially sound, this is consistent with scal stability. If the ECB cannot commit,
and is constrained to follow time-consistent policies, then ignoring the scal
consequences of its actions enables to the ECB to pursue far more reasonable
policies with a signicant welfare gain.
The results in this paper extend and di¤er from many earlier results obtained
in the context of closed economies. Generally, when scal policy does not have
access to a commitment technology and is therefore constrained to follow time-
consistent policies, this means that steady state debt no longer follows a random
walk (as shown in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007) in contrast to the random
walk results of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and Benigno and Woodford
(2003)). In extending this to the case of a monetary union, we show that
national debt correction is relatively gradual because of the need to preserve
national price competitiveness. This is in sharp contrast to the closed economy
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(or isomorphic exible exchange rate small open economy2) case under (time-
consistent) discretion, where optimal debt correction is very rapid (Leith and
Wren-Lewis (2007)). As the need to preserve national competitiveness moves
the path of debt closer to the commitment solution, it improves welfare under
discretion.
The literature that has explored the time-inconsistency of optimal scal pol-
icy, where policymakers do not have access to non-distortionary tax instru-
ments, has typically assumed a ex price environment. For example, in Lucas
and Stokey (1983) surprise ination e¤ectively acts as a lump-sum tax on real
money balances allowing the scal consequences of shocks to be dealt with cost-
lessly. In contrast, when monetary injections cannot be fully spent in the period
in which they occur (Nicolini, 1998), time consistent policy may actually result
in surprise deations rather than inations. This and other papers show that
the desired long-run level of debt under the time-consistent policy may actually
be positive or negative, depending on preferences and whether or not debt is
real or nominal (see for example, Diaz-Gimenez et al (2008) and Ellison and
Rankin (2007)) or if the government can only issue risk-free debt (Aiuagari et
al, 2002). In the case of nominal debt it is the temptation to use surprise in-
ation/deation to inuence the real level of government debt that drives the
time inconsistency problem.
The results in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) suggest that even a "minis-
cule" degree of price stickiness means that it ceases to be optimal (under a
Ramsey policy) to use surprise ination in this way. As a result, it may be
thought that the time-inconsistency problem in a sticky-price environment may
be slight. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007) show that this is not the case. They
demonstrate that in a closed New Keynesian economy time consistent policy
will very rapidly return debt to its (e¢ cient) pre-shock level. While surprise
ination plays some role in this adjustment, most of the correction takes place
through a reduction in real debt service costs and an expansion of the tax base
in a sticky-price economy. They also show that the inability to commit has a
signicant welfare cost. In our extension to a monetary union, we show that the
time-inconsistency problem facing national scal policy makers is less important
than that facing the ECB.
In performing the analysis we employ a linear-quadratic approximation to
the national and union-wide policy problem for reasons of tractability. In simpler
closed economy models (typically with exible prices) projection techniques (see
Herr and Maussner 2009, chapter 6, for a discussion) are often employed to
analyse the non-linear policy problem. However, in our multi-country monetary
union model both deriving the model, the policy makersobjective functions and
aggregating non-linear national scal policies without the tractability benets
of a linear-quadratic approximation would be infeasible.3
2Gali and Monacelli (2005) show that the policy problem for the small open economy can
be isomorphic to that in the closed economy. While Kirsanova et al. (2008) discuss the
conditions under which this holds true.
3However, exploring the use of non-linear solution techniques for a monetary union made
up of a nite number of economies is an interesting area for future research.
3
The next section derives the model. Section 3 outlines the social planners
problem such that we can write our model in gapform. This representation
of the model can also be used to derive a quadratic approximation to welfare.
In section 4 we derive the optimal policies for a continuum of economies partic-
ipating in monetary union, as well as the ECBs response to those policies. A
conclusion summarises the main results.
2 The Model
This section outlines our model. As noted above this is similar in structure to
GM, but we allow for a distortionary labour income tax and government debt.
2.1 Households
There are a continuum of households of size one, and we shall assume full asset
markets, such that, through risk sharing, they will face the same budget con-
straint and make the same consumption plans. As a result the typical household
will seek to maximise the following objective function, where for tractability
we assume (following GM) that the utility function takes the specic form
E0
1X
t=0
t(lnCt +  lnGt   (Nt)
1+'
1 + '
) (1)
where C,G and N are a consumption aggregate, a public goods aggregate, and
labour supply respectively.
The consumption aggregate is dened as
C =
C1 H C

F
(1  )(1 ) (2)
where, if we drop the time subscript, all variables are commensurate. CH is a
composite of domestically produced goods given by
CH = (
Z 1
0
CH(j)
" 1
 dj)

 1 (3)
where j denotes the goods type or variety. The aggregate CF is an aggregate
across countries i
CF = (
Z 1
0
C
 1

i di)

 1 (4)
where Ci is an aggregate similar to (3). Finally the public goods aggregate is
given by
G = (
Z 1
0
G(j)
" 1
 dj)

 1 (5)
which implies that public goods are all domestically produced. The elasticity of
substitution between varieties  > 1 is common across countries. The parameter
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 is (inversely) related to the degree of home bias in preferences, and is a
natural measure of openness. This gives rise to the intratemporal allocation of
consumption across the various consumption baskets detailed in Appendix 1.
The budget constraint at time t is given byZ 1
0
PH;t(j)CH;t(j)dj +
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
Pi;t(j)Ci;t(j)djdi+Qt;t+1Dt+1 (6)
= t +Dt +WtNt(1   t)  Tt
where Pi;t(j) is the price of variety j imported from country i expressed in
home currency, Dt+1 is the nominal payo¤ of the portfolio held at the end of
period t,  is the representative households share of prots in the imperfectly
competitive rms, W are wages,  is an wage income tax rate, and T are lump
sum taxes. Qt;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for one period ahead payo¤s.
Using the price indices dened in Appendix 2 this can be rewritten as
PtCt +Qt;t+1Dt+1 = t +Dt +WtNt(1   t)  Tt (7)
where Pt is the consumer price level. Appendix 1 also denes the various price
and exchange rate identities.
2.1.1 HouseholdsProblem
The rst of the households intertemporal problems involves allocating consump-
tion expenditure across time. We assume that the elasticity of substitution be-
tween the baskets of foreign goods produced in di¤erent countries is  = 1 (this
is equivalent to adopting logarithmic utility in the aggregation of such baskets).
We can then maximise utility subject to the budget constraint (7) to obtain the
optimal allocation of consumption across time,
(
Ct
Ct+1
)(
Pt
Pt+1
) = Qt;t+1 (8)
Taking conditional expectations on both sides and rearranging gives
RtEtf( Ct
Ct+1
)(
Pt
Pt+1
)g = 1 (9)
where Rt = 1EtfQt;t+1g is the gross return on a riskless one period bond paying
o¤ a unit of domestic currency in t+ 1. This is the familiar consumption Euler
equation which implies that consumers are attempting to smooth consumption
over time such that the marginal utility of consumption is equal across periods
(after allowing for tilting due to interest rates di¤ering from the households
rate of time preference).
A log-linearised version of (9) can be written as
ct = Etfct+1g   (rt   Etft+1g   ) (10)
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where lowercase denotes logs (with an important exception for g noted below),
 = 1   1, and t = pt   pt 1 is consumer price ination.
The labour supply decision is given by,
(1  )

W
P

= N'C (11)
where we can see that the distortionary labour income tax will impact on the
householdslabour supply decisions.
2.2 International Risk Sharing (IRS)
We assume symmetric initial conditions (e.g. zero net foreign assets etc) and
recalling the rst-order condition for consumption, (9), we note that since nan-
cial markets are complete, a similar condition must exist in the foreign economy,
say country i,


Cit+1
Cit
 1
P it
P it+1

"i;t
"i;t+1

= Qt;t+1 (12)
Equating the two, using the denition of the real exchange rate, Qi;t = "itP

t
Pt
,
and iterating backwards this can be written as,
Ct = z
iCitQi;t (13)
where zi is a constant which depends upon initial conditions. Log-linearising,
integrating over all countries and using the relationship between the terms of
trade and the real exchange rate yields,
c = c + (1  )s (14)
where c =
R 1
0
cidi.
2.3 The Government
2.3.1 Allocation of Government Spending
The allocation of government spending across goods is determined by minimising
total costs,
R 1
0
PH(j)G(j)dj. Given the form of the basket of public goods this
implies,
G(j) = (
PH(j)
PH
) G (15)
2.3.2 Government Debt
Appendix 3 derives the intertemporal budget constraint for the union as a whole,Z
"iD
i
tdi =  
1X
T=t
Et[Qt;T (
Z 1
0
(Pi;TG
i
T  W iTN iT ( iT   {i)  T iT )di)] (16)
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where
R
"iD
i
tdi is the aggregate level of the national debt stocks and {i is a
steady-state production subsidy which will be used to render the steady-state
e¢ cient (see below). With global market clearing in asset markets the series
of national budget constraints imply that the only public-sector intertemporal
budget constraint in our model is a global constraint. What is the intuition
for this? Given complete capital markets and our assumed initial conditions
(zero net foreign assets and identical ex ante structures in each economy) this
means that initially consumers expect similar scal policy regimes in their re-
spective economies. To the extent that ex post this is not the case, there will be
state contingent payments under IRS that ensure marginal utilities are equated
throughout the world (after controlling for real exchange rate di¤erences). This
would seem to suggest that scal sustainability questions within this framework
are a global rather than a national concern. Further, given that a national gov-
ernments contribution to global nances is negligible then this could be taken
to imply that debt is not an issue in utilising scal instruments at the national
level.
However, given the scal institutions which have been constructed as part
of EMU, it seems unlikely that without such constraints each member state
would expect to operate under ex ante similar scal regimes. Similarly, it seems
reasonable to assume that risk sharing of the form adopted in this paper could
only exist if there was some homogeneity in scal regimes across economies.
Therefore we follow Canzoneri et al. (2001) and assume that each government
operates with a positive stock of debt such that each economy faces a budget
constraint of this form at the national level. Therefore we impose, as an external
constraint created within the institutions of EMU or International Risk Sharing,
a national government budget constraint of the form,
Dit =  
1X
T=t
Et[Qt;T (Pi;TG
i
T  W iTN iT ( iT   {i)  T iT )] (17)
In order to support the assumption that the steady-state level of output is
e¢ cient (which facilitates the derivation of welfare functions below) an obvious
assumption to make is that lump-sum taxation is used to nance the steady-state
subsidy (which o¤sets, in steady-state, the distortions caused by distortionary
taxation and imperfect competition in price setting). We shall then assume
that lump-sum taxation cannot be used to alter this subsidy or to nance any
other government activities, including the kind of spending and distortionary
tax adjustments as stabilisation measures we are interested in. This implies
that W iTN
i
T{i = T iT in all our economies at all points in time, allowing us to
simplify the budget constraint to,
Bit 1Rt 1 =  
1X
T=t
Et[Qt;T (Pi;TG
i
T  W iTN iT  iT )] (18)
i.e. distortionary taxation and spending adjustments are required to service
government debt as well as stabilise the economy. This denes the basic trade-
o¤ facing policy makers in utilising these instruments.
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This intertemporal budget constraint implies the ow budget constraint for
the national government, in real terms,
bit
Rt
=
Pi;t 1
Pi;t
bit 1 +G
i
t  
W it
Pi;t
N it 
i
t (19)
where bit =
BitRt
Pi;t
. Since we are considering cashless economies there are no
seigniorage revenue transfers resulting from the ECBs monetary policies.
2.4 Firms
The production function is linear, so for rm j
Y (j) = AN(j) (20)
where a = ln(A) is time varying and stochastic. The demand curve they face is
given by,
Y (j) = (
PH(j)
PH
) [(1  )(PC
PH
) + 
Z 1
0
(
"iP
iCi
PH
)di+G] (21)
which we rewrite as,
Y (j) = (
PH(j)
PH
) Y (22)
where Y =
hR 1
0
Y (j)
 1
 dj
i 
 1
. The objective function of the rm is given by,
1X
s=0
()sQt;t+s

PH(j)t
P
t+s
Y (j)t+s   Wt+s
Pt+s
Y (j)t+s(1  {)
At+s

(23)
where { is an employment subsidy which can be used to eliminate the steady-
state distortion associated with monopolistic competition and distortionary
labour income taxes (assuming there is a lump-sum tax available to nance
such a subsidy). Solving for the optimal reset price, which is common across all
rms able to reset prices in period t,
PH;t =
P1
s=0()
sQt;t+s
h
Wt+sPt+s P

H;t+s
Yt+s
At+s
i
P1
s=0()
sQt;t+s
h
(  1)P 1t+sP H;t+sYt+s(1  {)
i (24)
Domestic prices evolve according to,
PH;t =
h
(1  w)P (1 )H;t + wP 1 H;t 1
i 1
1 
(25)
Appendix 4 then details the derivation of the New Keynesian Phillips curve
for domestic price ination which is given by,
H;t = EtH;t+1 + (mct + ln(t)) (26)
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where  = (1 )(1 ) and mc =  a + w   pH   v =  a + p   pH + 'n +
c   ln(1   )   v are the real log-linearised marginal costs of production, and
v =   ln(1   {). In the absence of sticky prices prot maximising behaviour
implies, mct =   ln(t) where t is the desired mark-up.
2.5 Equilibrium
Using the denition of aggregate output and the rms demand curve (21) allows
us to write
Y = (1  )PC
PH
+ 
Z 1
0
(
"iP
iCi
PH
)di+G
= S[(1  )C + 
Z 1
0
QiCidi] +G
= CS +G (27)
Taking logs implies
y   g = c+ s (28)
= c + s (29)
where we dene g =   ln(1  GY ). As this condition holds for all countries, andR 1
0
sidi = 0, we have
y =
Z 1
0
(ci + gi)di = c + g (30)
From the denition of the terms of trade, within a monetary union this implies
the following link between competitiveness and national output,
yt = gt +c

t + 

t   H;t (31)
which forms an additional constraint on the national policymaker.
2.6 Summary of Model
We are now in a position to summarise our model. For a representative union
member, i, on the demand side we have an Euler equation for consumption,
yit = Etfyit+1g   (rt   Etfi;t+1g   )  Etfgit+1   gitg (32)
but where the nominal interest rate, rt, is under the control of the ECB and
not a national monetary authority. On the supply side there is an equation for
domestic price ination,
i;t = Etfi;t+1g+ (mcit + ln(it)) (33)
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where  = [(1   )(1   )]= and mcit =  ait + wit   pi;t   ln(1    it)   v =
(1+')(yit  ait)  ln(1   it)  git and there is the government budget constraint,
(bbit   rt) = (bbit 1   i;t) + Gi
B
i
(
1  i
i
bgit + byit) (34)
 W
i
N
i
B
i
((1 + ')(byit   ait) + byit   bgit + 11    it)
If this was a small open economy operating its own monetary policy then this
would be su¢ cient to describe the domestic economy. However, as a result
of joining the monetary union, an individual economy has lost control of the
monetary policy instrument and they must take account of the repercussions of
their actions on competitiveness,
yit = g
i
t +c

t + 

t   iH;t (35)
For the union as a whole,
yt = g

t + c

t (36)
where yt =
1Z
0
yitdi, c

t =
1Z
0
citdi, g

t =
1Z
0
gitdi, b

t =
1Z
0
bitdi and 

t =
1Z
0
itdi
The model is then closed by policy makers specifying the appropriate values
of the scal and monetary policy variables. However, although this represents
a fully specied model it is often recast in the form of gapvariables which are
more consistent with utility-based measures of welfare. This transformation is
contained in Appendix 5.
3 Optimal policy
3.1 The Social Planners Problem in a Monetary Union
In order to develop an objective function with which to evaluate optimal policy
it is helpful to begin by analysing the social planners problem. The social
planner simply decides how to allocate consumption and production of goods
within the economy, subject to the various constraints implied by operating as
part of a larger group of economies e.g. International Risk Sharing (IRS). Since
he is concerned with real allocations, the social planner ignores nominal inertia
and distortionary taxation in describing optimal allocations. Accordingly, the
solution to the social planners problem provides a benchmark for optimal policy,
and can be used to compute the steady-state subsidy which would ensure the
steady-state is e¢ cient. In the face of shocks it is often optimal to deviate from
this steady-state and stabilisation policy can then be based on attempting to
ensure such deviations are as close to optimal as is possible given the various
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sources of nominal inertia and distortionary taxation which are present in the
model.
Here the social planner maximises utility across all countries subject to
Y i = AiN i (37)
Y i = Cii +
Z 1
0
Cji dj +G
i (38)
Recall that utility for country i at time t is
lnCit +  lnG
i
t  
(N it )
1+'
1 + '
(39)
and
Ci = (Y i  Gi)1 [
Z 1
0
Cji dj]
 (40)
Optimisation implies
(N i)' = Ai
1  
Cii
= Ai
Z 1
0

Cji
dj = Ai
i
Gi
(41)
and,
N i = (1 + i)
1
1+' (42)
Ci = (
1  
1 + i
)Y i (43)
Cji = (

1 + i
)Y i j 6= i (44)
Gi =
i
1 + i
Y i =
iAi
(1 + i)
'
1+'
(45)
The latter implies g = ln(1+i) which is a di¤erent scal rule than in the case
of the small open economy. Why? In the small open economy case governments
have an incentive to increase government spending (which is devoted solely to
domestically produced goods) to induce an appreciation in the terms of trade. In
aggregate this cannot happen, but it leaves government spending ine¢ ciently
high. The government spending rule under monetary union eliminates this
externality. This also has implications for the derivation of union and national
welfare which are discussed below.
3.2 Social Welfare
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Appendix 6 derives the quadratic approximation to utility across member states
to obtain a union-wide objective function.
  =   (1 + )
2
1X
t=0
t
Z 1
0
[


2i;t + (y
i;g
t )
2(1 + ') +
1

(gi;gt )
2]di
+tip+ o

kak3

(46)
It contains quadratic terms in price ination reecting the costs of price disper-
sion induced by ination in the presence of nominal inertia, as well as terms in
the output gap and government spending gap. The weights attached to each
element are a function of deep model parameters. The key to obtaining this
quadratic specication is in adopting an employment subsidy which eliminates
the distortions caused by imperfect competition in product markets as well as
the impact of distortionary income taxes. It is also important to note that it is
assumed that national scal authorities have internalised the externality caused
by their desire to appreciate the terms of trade relative to other union-members
through excessive government expenditure.
In performing the analysis we employ a linear-quadratic approximation to
the national and union-wide policy problem for reasons of tractability. In simpler
closed economy models (typically with exible prices) projection techniques (see
Herr and Maussner 2009, chapter 6, for a discussion) are often employed to
analyse the non-linear policy problem. However, in our multi-country monetary
union model both deriving the model, the policy makersobjective functions and
aggregating non-linear national scal policies without the tractability benets of
a linear-quadratic approximation would be infeasible. An alternative approach
to developing a valid linear-quadratic approximation to the policy problem is
outlined in Benigno and Woodford (2003), who show that taking second order
approximations of some key model equations can allow one to eliminate the
linear terms that would otherwise be present when the steady-state is ine¢ cient.
This approach has been applied to the two-country monetary-union case by
Ferrero (2006), but this approach can only consider optimal policy from the
timeless perspective, whereas we wish to focus on discretionary policy.
Appendix 6 also derives the objective function for the individual union mem-
ber as,
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This contains linear terms which capture the desire of national scal authorities
to manipulate their terms-of-trade to their national advantage. These terms
are not present in the union-wide welfare function as collectively it is futile
for all union members to attempt to change their terms of trade. However,
in order to avoid introducing a permanent conict between national and union-
wide objectives we assume that individual union members resist the (collectively
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pointless) temptation to exploit their neighbours in this way and we set these
linear terms to zero. However, there is no coordination beyond this, and in
response to shocks the national scal authorities will only consider national
welfare in setting policy and will take union-wide economic conditions as given,
thereby ignoring their aggregate impact on the union-wide economy..
Note we can decompose union wide welfare as the sum of quadratic terms
in union-wide aggregates and the cross-sectional variance across the union,
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Since all economies are loglinearised around the same steady-state the ECB
can only a¤ect the mean across the union and not the variance across union
members, it is only the second line of this welfare measure that is relevant for
the ECB in setting union-wide monetary policy.
4 Responding to Debt Shocks
In this section we examine the optimal policy response to both idiosyncratic
(national) and union-wide debt shocks. We consider discretionary and commit-
ment policies and compute the welfare benets of employing our various scal
and monetary instruments as stabilisation devices. Following GM we adopt the
following parameter set, ' = 1,  = 1:2,  = 6,  = 0:7,  = 0:99,  = 0:4;
and  = 0:25. The ratio of government spending to gdp of 0.25 implies that
 = 1  = 1=3 in the MU case. The ratio of consumption to steady-state out-
put will therefore be 0:75, with 60% of that devoted to domestically produced
goods. In contrasting the policy responses to debt shocks we shall focus on
helicopter drops of government bonds. However, in computing welfare we shall
allow debt to be bu¤eted by a mixture of technology and mark-up shocks. The
productivity shock follows the following pattern,
at = aat 1 + t (49)
where, following the Bayesian estimation of Smets and Wouters (2005) for the
Euro area we adopt a degree of persistence in the productivity shock of a = 0:99
with a standard deviation of 0.69. While the iid mark-up shock has a standard
deviation of 0.19.
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4.1 National Fiscal Policies
The national scal authorities face the following policy problem whereby they
seek to minimise their contribution to the union-wide welfare,
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In constructing this welfare measure we assume that by participating in the
monetary union the national scal authorities do not attempt to utilise their
instruments to achieve a devaluation relative to other union members, which
collectively cannot happen. Therefore, the national scal authorities internalise
this particular externality, but still take the state of the rest of the union as
given when conducting national scal policy.
The constraints faced by the national scal authority are the national NKPC,
i;t = Etfi;t+1g+ [(1 + ')yi;gt   gi;gt +

1  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t ] (51)
the impact of national policies on competitiveness vis a vis the rest of the union
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and the national government budget constraint,
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In solving the model we use the Matlab codes of Soderlind(1999). Soderlind
considers a model in the following form,
x1t+1
Etx2t+1

= A

x1t
x2t

+But +

"t+1
0

(54)
where x1t is a vector of predetermined variables, x2t are jump variables, ut are
controls and "t are shocks to the predetermined variables. The policy makers
objectives are given by,
J0 = E0
1X
t=0
t[x
0
tQxt + 2x
0
tUut + u
0
tRut] (55)
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This can either be solved under discretion or commitment, but we focus on
discretion in the context of national scal policies since it is far from clear that
national governments have access to a commitment technology.
We can construct the policy problem for the national economy, taking union-
wide variables as given, as shown in Appendix 7(1). Using the Oudiz and Sachs
(1985) iterative procedure this delivers a solution of the form,
x1t+1 =Mx1t + "t+1, x2t = Cx1t and ut = Fx1t (56)
Figure 1 details the national scal response to a 1% shock to national debt.
This shock is analogous to a helicopter drop of money, but applied to govern-
ment bonds. It is a useful device in describing the policy response to scal
shocks without complicating the analysis by assuming the scal shock is driven
by a more fundamental shock (such as a technology shock) which would, in
itself, result in a desired policy response in addition to the need to satisfy the
governments intertemporal budget constraint. When we consider the welfare
consequences of alternative policy regimes below, we do not include such shocks,
but consider more standard technology shocks which have scal consequences.
In response to the higher national debt, the scal authorities cut government
spending and raises tax rates. Although the lower government spending reduces
aggregate demand, the higher distortionary tax rates discourages labour supply
and fuels rmsmarginal costs. The higher ination that emerges implies that
the domestic economy is losing competitiveness, which further reduces output
and consumption. Eventually, this comes to dominate the higher tax rate and
ination turns negative as the economy slowly regains its lost competitiveness.
A notable feature of this impulse response is that the correction of debt is
gradual.
For the functional forms and parameterisation considered in this study, if our
economies were to operate under exible exchange rates the policy problem is
isomorphic to the closed economy cases analysed in Leith andWren-Lewis (2008)
where time consistency implies a very rapid scal correction, primarily through
reductions in real interest rates in a sticky-price environment. Nevertheless,
in order to make clear the di¤erence between the response to the debt shock
inside or outside of a monetary union, Figure 2 plots the impulse response
of Figure 1 alongside the response to the same shock if the national policies
operate under exible exchange rates and retain use of a national monetary
policy instrument. In this case, the national monetary authority would cut
interest rates, reducing debt service costs, boosting output and the tax base
and fueling ination. Government spending falls, and tax rates rise (although
with more exible prices tax rates can fall to moderate the increase in ination
that would otherwise emerge).
At rst it may appear that the gradual scal correction within a monetary
union is due to the fact that national policy makers do not have access to
a monetary policy instrument to engineer the desired change in real interest
rates. However, the distortionary tax rates could achieve signicant movements
in real interest rates through their impact on domestic ination such that slower
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scal correction is not due to a lack of instruments. Instead, the main driving
force behind the slow adjustment is the fact that within a monetary union the
scal authorities are constrained by the need to restore competitiveness between
the national economy and the rest of the monetary union. This inhibits the use
of distortionary taxes to manipulate domestic ination and thereby real debt
service costs since any ination generated subsequently has to be undone to
regain competitiveness. This greatly mitigates the time inconsistency problem
detailed in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2008).
We can further explore the sensitivity of the speed of national scal correc-
tion to di¤erent debt-gdp ratios and degrees of price stickiness. Figure 3 plots
the half-life of debt (the time it takes debt to return half way to its steady-state
value) as a function of the steady-state debt to GDP ratio and the degree of
price stickiness. While debt levels do not have a signicant inuence, the speed
of debt correction is strongly inversely related to the extent of price stickiness.
This strongly contrasts to the closed economy literature where price stickiness
reduces the ability of ination surprises to stabilise debt quickly (or costlessly
and instantaneously in the limiting case of exible prices - see Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2004)). The reason is quite intuitive. When prices are relatively
exible, any attempt to move scal instruments to stabilise debt will generate
more ination with a greater impact on competitiveness. This inhibits the scal
authority and results in a slow scal response which is close to the random walk
found under commitment (see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and Benigno
and Woodford (2003)).
Finally, we explore the impact of competitiveness on the speed of scal cor-
rection. Figure 4 considers the same debt shock as Figure 1, but combined it
with a negative competitiveness shock of 1%. With the competitiveness shock
the adjustment of debt is relatively more rapid (although still no where near
the speed of correction one nds under exible exchange rates). Moreover, if we
contrast the impulse response to the combined competitiveness and debt shock,
with the case of only a competitiveness shock without any direct debt shock
then the marginal e¤ect of the shock to debt is much the same as the case of a
debt shock alone. In other words, the marginal national scal response to the
scal consequences of shocks is not greatly a¤ected by the national economys
initial competitiveness position. These results are summarised in Table 1.
Table 1 - Summary of National Fiscal Policy Experiments
Fig. Regime Time Consistent? DebtGDP Price Stickiness,  Debt Adjustment.
1 EMU Yes 60% 0.7 Gradual
2 Flex er Yes 60% 0.7 Rapid
3 EMU Yes 0-100% 0-0.75 Gradual
4  Competitiveness Yes 60% 0.7 Gradual
4.2 ECBs Response to National Fiscal Policies
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We now turn to consider the implications for this national scal behaviour for
the ECB. Essentially, by implementing a policy like the one just described,
the national scal authorities will be ensuring scal stabilisation whatever the
state of the rest of the union. Accordingly, the ECB could choose to ignore the
scal consequences of their actions without jeopardising national or union-wide
scal solvency. In maximising social welfare the ECB may take into account
the impact that high debt will have on distortionary taxes and therefore output
and ination, and in addition will know that monetary policy can inuence the
level of debt.
Formally, the ECBs optimisation problem assumes they are seeking to min-
imise union wide losses,
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where the variance in outcomes across member states is collected in the tip term
as the ECB cannot inuence the cross-sectional variance of outcomes across the
symmetrical economies which have entered the monetary union. The aggregate
constraints facing the ECB are given by the NKPC,
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the union-wide national accounting identity,
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The ECB also considers the aggregate scal behaviour of the national scal au-
thorities. Under discretion, the national scal authorities will implement policy
rules which relate their instruments (uit - government spending and distortionary
tax rates) to the state variables (national debt, national technology and mark-up
shocks, national competitiveness, and union-wide variables) uit = Fx
i
1t. Since
all economies in the monetary union are symmetrical, the form of the national
scal response is the same for each member state (although di¤erent shocks may
imply di¤erent debt levels and levels of competitiveness across member states
at any point in time) which means that the national scal reaction functions
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can be aggregated. This allows us to embed the aggregate of the national scal
responses in the ECBs policy problem as described in Appendix 7(2).
We can then solve the ECBs policy problem under either discretion or com-
mitment where it knows the scal reaction function of the national scal au-
thorities. Both cases are considered in Figure 4 which details the union-wide
response to an aggregate debt shock of 1%. Under commitment, the ECB no
longer follows the random walk in steady-state debt we typically observe in the
closed or exible exchange rate open economy cases. The reason is that the
ECB takes into account the repercussions of its actions on debt and the na-
tional scal responses to that. Under commitment, the ECB cuts union-wide
interest rates to help reduce union wide debt, but only moderately such that
the debt stabilisation remains gradual. In contrast, under discretion, the ECB
aggressively moves its interest rate instrument to return union-wide debt levels
to steady-state. In fact it is so aggressive that it actually overshoots within a
single period. In this case the ECB cannot resist the time-inconsistency prob-
lem that the national scal authorities partially can by facing a competitiveness
constraint, and is compelled to act to stabilise the debt very quickly.
Why? Unless inationary expectations are particularly high the ECB has
an incentive to introduce policy surprises in order to stabilise debt at a lower
cost than implied by the collective national scal adjustments. Anticipating
such behaviour inationary expectations rise until the ECB no longer has the
incentive to introduce policy surprises. However the welfare costs of this are so
great that the ECB will seek to eliminate excess debt and the attendant time-
consistency problem as quickly as possible. The overcorrection occurs because
even with a complete correction the policy maker would still have incentives to
introduce policy surprises to change the policy mix used to stabilise the debt. In
a Euro area economy subject to the technology and mark-up shocks estimated by
Smets and Wouters (2005), the welfare consequences of this are signicant with
the costs of union-wide technology and mark-up shocks rising from 0.00001726%
of steady-state consumption to 0.0141% of steady-state consumption as we move
from commitment to discretion.4
If we increase the weight attached to ination by the ECB then the rapid
scal correction under discretion is una¤ected unless the weight is signicantly
increased, to levels which imply that the ECB is e¤ectively a strict ination
targeter. For example with a probability of no price change of  = 0:6, the
weight on ination has to increase 13 fold to prevent ECB from utilising its
instrument to stabilise government debt across the monetary union. In other
words, even although the national scal authorities are running sound scal
policies which are capable of stabilising debt in an orderly manner, in the absence
4The relatively small value of the welfare number under commitment, reects the richness
of the instrument set available to policy makers, where, if lump sum taxes where available
to satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint, the national policy makers would be able to
perfectly stabilise their economies in the face of idiosyncratic shocks and the ECB in the
face of union-wide shocks. Adding additional frictions such as sticky wages would raise this
number, but the relative costs of time-consistency would remain - see Leith and Wren-Lewis
(2007).
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of a commitment technology, the ECB cannot resist the temptation to o¤set the
costs of national scal corrections by using monetary policy to inuence average
debt levels in the monetary union.
4.3 The Conventional Assignment
While it is conventional in the literature to assume that monetary policy max-
imises social welfare (under discretion or commitment), the relationship between
monetary and scal policy in many countries is often characterised as an assign-
ment regime. Monetary policy is assigned short term stabilisation of output and
ination, and scal policy is assigned control of government debt (Kirsanova et
al. (2009) call this the conventional assignment). Although this assignment is
most often discussed in terms of the merits or otherwise of scal countercyclical
policy (see Eser et al. (2009)), it also implicitly implies that monetary policy
should not concern itself with government debt. Of course government debt
does not appear directly in any measure of social welfare, but it does impact
on that measure indirectly because debt has to be nanced and taxes are dis-
tortionary. As the previous section showed, this can mean that monetary does
react strongly to debt if it maximises social welfare.
Given this, how can we characterise the conventional assignment within an
optimisation framework, and potentially avoid monetary policy responding to
debt under discretion? In what follows we assume that the ECB still seeks to
maximise social welfare, but takes national scal variables as given and ignores
the existence of national government budget constraints. Consider the ECBs
objective function,
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The term in government spending is now taken as given and is considered as tip
in the ECBs optimisation. The aggregate constraints facing the ECB are given
by the aggregate NKPC,
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Etft+1g+ [(1 + ')y;gt   g;gt +
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and the national accounting identity for the union as a whole,
y;gt = g
;g
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t (62)
Under commitment the rst order conditions for the ECBs policy problem
are given by,


(t ) + 

t = 0 (63)
and
(y;gt )(1 + ')  (1 + ')t = 0 (64)
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where t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the union-wide NKPC.
When the rst order conditions are combined we obtain the target criterion,
(t ) = (y
;g
t ) (65)
It should be noted that this is the standard target criterion for monetary pol-
icy in closed economy analyses which ignore scal policy (see, for example,
Woodford (2003)). Accordingly, integrating this criterion forward in time has
the implication that the ECB will seek to return the price level to base fol-
lowing any shocks. It is this commitment that allows commitment policy to
achieve a better trade-o¤ between output and ination stabilisation than would
be achieved under time-consistent policy.
Under discretion the ECB takes union-wide inationary expectations as
given such that the target criterion reduces to,
(t ) = (y
;g
t ) (66)
and the ECB no longer seeks to return the price level to base follow shocks.
When we assume that the ECB simply takes the value of scal instruments
as given and ignores the repercussions of its actions on debt (and any subsequent
scal response) then we obtain the results shown in Figure 5. In this case, the
union-wide debt correction is gradual under both discretion and commitment.
The main di¤erence between commitment and discretion lies in the ination
response where the ECBs commitment to return the price level to base has
expectational benets which signicantly reduce the inationary consequences
of the debt shock. The welfare costs of ECB commitment and discretion are
0.0003037% and 0.000378% of steady-state consumption, respectively which is
double the levels observed under the combination of ECB leadership and com-
mitment, but remains a fraction of the level observed when the ECB recognises
national government budget constraints, but cannot commit.
4.4 Robustness to Steady-State Debt Levels
In this sub-section we briey explore the impact of varying the level of debt and
the extent of price stickiness on our results above. In Figure 6 we outline the
time consistent response to a union-wide debt shock when the ECB recognises
the impact of its actions on debt and the national scal authorities. Here we nd
that at very low debt levels the rapid scal correction disappears as variations
in real interest rates on very small debt stocks are not such a temptation for
policymakers. Under other policy permutations, price stickiness a¤ects results
in same way as national policy. These policy experiments are summarised in
Table 2.
Table 2 - Summary of ECB Policy Experiments
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Fig Regime Time Consistent? DebtGDP Price Stickiness,  Debt Adjustment
5 ECB Stackelberg Leader Yes 60% 0.7 Gradual
No 60% 0.7 Rapid
6 ECB ignores Fiscal Policy Yes 60% 0.7 Gradual
No 60% 0.7 Gradual
7 ECB Stackelberg Leader Yes 15% 0.7 Gradual
50% 0.7 Rapid
80% 0.7 Rapid
5 Conclusions
In this paper we explored the impact of time-consistent national scal poli-
cies on the ECBs monetary policy. We found that, in contrast to the closed
economy or exible exchange rate cases, national scal policies in a monetary
union would act to gradually stabilise national government debt stocks following
shocks through a combination of tax increases and government spending cuts.
Despite the fact that national scal policies were essentially sound, in the sense
that they steadily stabilised debt following shocks, the ECB would attempt to
utilise its policy instrument to inuence union-wide average government debt
levels. Under commitment this e¤ect was slight, but when constrained to be
time-consistent, the ECB would strongly adjust policy to rapidly adjust union-
wide debt. Essentially, under commitment the ECB resists the temptation to
introduce policy surprises to reduce the need for national governments to make
the costly scal corrections. Under discretion, this temptation results in a very
rapid debt correction through changes in debt service costs, the union-wide tax
base and the induced national scal response to ECB policy. It is important to
note that the ECB does not behave in this way because of potentially reckless
behaviour on the part of the national scal authorities. Nor does it have an
explicit debt target. In fact, the ECB would only stop rapidly stabilising the
union-wide debt stock if its relative weight on ination was increased such that
it behaved in a manner close to a strict ination targeter.
This has another implication for optimal ECB policy. If the ECB cannot
commit (even if it may be conservative) then it should not maximise union wide
welfare in the usual way. Instead, welfare would be improved by ensuring the
ECB followed the conventional assignment and ignored union wide debt and the
national scal response to it.
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Appendix 1 - Intratemporal Consumption Alloca-
tion
Households must rst decide how to allocate a given level of expenditure
across the various goods that are available. They do so by adjusting the share
of a particular good in their consumption bundle to exploit any relative price dif-
ferences - this minimises the costs of consumption. Optimisation of expenditure
for any individual good implies the demand functions given below,
CH(j) = (
PH(j)
PH
) CH (67)
Ci(j) = (
Pi(j)
Pi
) Ci (68)
where we have price indices given by
PH = (
Z 1
0
PH(j)
1 dj)
1
1  (69)
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It follows that Z 1
0
PH(j)CH(j)dj = PHCH (71)Z 1
0
Pi(j)Ci(j)dj = PiCi (72)
Optimisation across imported goods by country implies
Ci = (
Pi
PF
) CF (73)
where
PF = (
Z 1
0
P 1 i di)
1
1  (74)
This implies Z 1
0
PiCidi = PFCF (75)
Optimisation between imported and domestically produced goods implies
PHCH = (1  )PC (76)
PFCF = PC (77)
where
P = P 1 H P

F (78)
is the consumer price index (CPI).
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Appendix 2 - Price and Exchange Rate Identi-
ties
The e¤ective terms of trade are given by
S =
PF
PH
(79)
which can be combined with the denition of consumer prices, (78), and in
logged rst-di¤erence form implies,
t = H;t + (st   st 1) (80)
There is assumed to be free-trade in goods, such that the law of one price
holds for individual goods at all times. This implies,
Pi(j) = "iP
i
i (j) (81)
where "i is the bilateral nominal exchange rate and P ii (j) is the price of county
is good j expressed in terms of country is currency. Aggregating across goods
this implies,
Pi = "iP
i
i (82)
where P ii =
R 1
0
P ii (j)
1 dj
 1
1 
.
From the denition of PF we have, in log-linearised form,
pF = e+ p
 (83)
where e =
R 1
0
eidi is the log of the nominal e¤ective exchange rate, pii is the
logged domestic price index for country i, and p =
R 1
0
piidi is the log of the
world price index. For the world as a whole there is no distinction between
consumer prices and the domestic (world) price level.
Combining the denition of the terms of trade and the result just obtained
gives
s = pF   pH
= e+ p   pH (84)
Now consider the link between the terms of trade and the real exchange
rate. (Note that although we have free trade and the law of one price holds for
individual goods, our economies do not exhibit PPP since there is a home bias
in the consumption of home and foreign goods. PPP only holds if we eliminate
this home bias and assume  = 1 since this implies that the share of home goods
in consumption is the same as any other countrys i.e. innitesimally small.)
The bilateral real exchange rate is dened as,
Qi =
"iP
i
P
(85)
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where P i and P are the two countries respective CPI price levels. In logged
form we can dene the real e¤ective exchange rate as,
qt =
Z 1
0
(ei + p
i   p)di
= e+ p   p
= s+ pH   p
= (1  )s (86)
Appendix 3 - Government Debt
Recall the home country consumers budget constraint,
PtCt +Qt;t+1Dt+1  t +Dt +WtNt(1   t)  Tt (87)
There is a unique stochastic discount factor which has the property,
At = Et[Qt;t+1Dt+1] (88)
where At is the end-of period nominal value of the households portfolio of
assets. If the household chooses to hold only risk-less one period bonds then
this condition becomes,
Dt+1 = RtAt
However, households will not only hold government bonds as they will wish to
hold a complete set of contingent assets. The wealth Dt+1being transferred into
the next period satises the bound,
Dt+1   
1X
T=t+1
Et+1[Qt+1;T (T +W (k)TN(k)T (1  T )  TT )] (89)
with certainty, no matter what state of the world emerges. These series of bor-
rowing constraints and ow budget constraints then denes the intertemporal
budget constraint. We rule out no-Ponzi schemes which amounts to,
1X
T=t
Et[Qt;T (T +W (k)TN(k)T (1  T )  TT )] <1 (90)
at each point in time across all possible states of the world. These can be
combined to yield the intertemporal budget constraint (see Woodford, 2003,
Chapter 2, page 69),
1X
T=t
Et[PTCT ]  Dt +
1X
T=t
Et[Qt;T (T +W (k)TN(k)T (1  T )  TT )] (91)
Note what this implies. Aggregating over households would, in a closed economy,
allow us to show the equivalence of private and public sector budget constraints.
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Noting the equivalence between factor incomes and national output,
PHY =WN +  {WN +  rPHYH (92)
we can rewrite the home countrys budget constraint as,
Dt =  
1X
T=t
Et[Qt;T (PH;TYT   PTCT  WTNT (T   {)   rTPH;TYH;T   TT )]
(93)
Recall the goods market clearing condition in the home economy,
Y = (1  )PC
PH
+ 
Z 1
0
(
"iP
iCi
PH
)di+G (94)
Similar conditions exist in economy j,
Y j = (1  )P
jCj
Pj
+ 
Z 1
0
(
"iP
iCi
"jPj
)di+Gj (95)
This can then be aggregated across member states,Z 1
0
"jPjY
jdj = (1  )
Z 1
0
"jP
jCjdj + 
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
("iP
iCi)didj +
Z 1
0
"jPjG
jdj
= (1  )
Z 1
0
"jP
jCjdj + 
Z 1
0
("iP
iCi)di+
Z 1
0
"jPjG
jdj
=
Z 1
0
"jP
jCjdj +
Z 1
0
"jPjG
jdj (96)
Integrating the budget constraints across economies and using this global market
clearing condition yields the intertemporal budget constraint for the union as a
whole,Z
"iD
i
tdi =  
1X
T=t
Et[Qt;T (
Z 1
0
(Pi;TG
i
T  W iTN iT ( iT   {i)  T iT )di)] (97)
where
R
"iD
i
tdi is the aggregate level of the national debt stocks. With global
market clearing in asset markets the series of national budget constraints imply
that the only public-sector intertemporal budget constraint in our model is
a global constraint. However, as discussed in the main text, we impose, as an
external constraint created within the institutions of EMU or International Risk
Sharing, a national government budget constraint of the form,
Dit =  
1X
T=t
Et[Qt;T (Pi;TG
i
T  W iTN iT ( iT   {i)  T iT )] (98)
In order to support the assumption that the steady-state level of output is
e¢ cient (which facilitates the derivation of welfare functions below) an obvious
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assumption to make is that lump-sum taxation is used to nance the steady-state
subsidy (which o¤sets, in steady-state, the distortions caused by distortionary
taxation and imperfect competition in price setting). We shall then assume
that lump-sum taxation cannot be used to alter this subsidy or to nance any
other government activities, including the kind of spending and distortionary
tax adjustments as stabilisation measures we are interested in. This implies
that W iTN
i
T{i = T iT in all our economies at all points in time, allowing us to
simplify the budget constraint to,
Bit 1Rt 1 =  
1X
T=t
Et[Qt;T (Pi;TG
i
T  W iTN iT  iT )] (99)
i.e. distortionary taxation and spending adjustments are required to service
government debt as well as stabilise the economy. This denes the basic trade-
o¤ facing policy makers in utilising these instruments.
The national ow budget constraint,
bit
Rt
=
Pi;t 1
Pi;t
bit 1 +G
i
t  
W it
Pi;t
N it 
i
t (100)
can be log-linearised as,
(bbit   brt) = (bbit 1   i;t) + Gi
B
i
ln
Git
Gi
  W
i
N
i
B
i
(crwit + bnit + b it) (101)
where bxt = ln(xt=x). Using the labour supply function (11) to eliminate real
product wages, along with the production function,
(bbit rt) = (bbit 1 i;t)+Gi
B
i
ln
Git
Gi
  W
i
N
i
B
i
((1+')(byit ait)+byit bgit+ 11    it)
(102)
Note, however, that gt in the model is dened as, ln(1   GY ). This implies,
to a rst order, that,
lnGi = ln(
Gi
Y i
) + ln(Y i)
= ln(1  exp( gi)) + yi
=
1  i
i
gi + yi (103)
where i;n = Gi=Y i. Introducing this to the budget constraint, and collecting
terms,
(bbit   rt) = (bbit 1   i;t) + (Gi
B
i
1  i
i
+
W
i
N
i
B
i
)bgit)  (R  1)byit
 W
i
N
i
B
i
((1 + ')(byit   ait) + 11    it) (104)
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Appendix 4 - Price Setting
Recall the optimal price set by rms that are able to reset prices in period
t;
PH;t =
P1
s=0()
sQt;t+s
h
Wt+sPt+s P

H;t+s
Yt+s
At+s
i
P1
s=0()
sQt;t+s
h
(  1)(1   rt+s)P 1t+sP H;t+sYt+s(1  )
i (105)
Note that in equilibrium,
s

Ct
Ct+s

Pt
Pt+s

= Qt;t+s (106)
Accordingly, the expression for the optimal price can be re-written as,
PH;t =
P1
s=0()
s CtPt
Ct+sPt+s
h
Wt+sPt+s P

H;t+s
Yt+s
At+s
i
P1
s=0()
s CtPt
Ct+sPt+s
h
(  1)(1   rt+s)P 1t+sP H;t+sYt+s(1  )
i (107)
After allowing the mark-up to be time varying due to mark-up shocks, this can
be log-linearised as,
pH;t = (1  )Et
 1X
s=0
(w)
s
 at+s + wt+s   ln(1   rt+s)  vt + ln(t)
!
(108)
where pH;t is the log of the optimal price set by those rms that were able to set
price in period t, and v =   ln(1 ): Quasi-di¤erencing this expression yields,
1
1   pH;t =
1
1   EtpH;t+1   at + wt   ln(1  
r
t )  vt + ln(t) (109)
While domestic prices evolve according to,
PH;t =
h
(1  )P 1 H;t + P 1 H;t 1
i 1
1 
(110)
This can be log-linearised as,
pH;t = (1  )pH;t + pH;t 1 (111)
Solving for pH;t and substituting into the expression for quasi-di¤erenced opti-
mal price yields,
1
1  

pH;t
1    
pH;t 1
1  

=
1
1   

EtpH;t+1
1    
pH;t
1  

(112)
 at + wt   ln(1   rt )  vt + ln(t)
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This can be solved as,
H;t = EtH;t+1 +
(1  )(1  )

(mct + ln(t)) (113)
where mct =  at+wt pH;t  ln(1  st ) vt are the real log-linearised marginal
costs of production. In the absence of sticky prices prot maximising behaviour
implies, mc =   ln().
Appendix 5 - Gap variables
Dene the natural level of (log) output yn as the level that would occur in the
absence of nominal inertia and conditional on the optimal choice of government
spending, the steady-state tax rates and the actual level of world output. Dene
the output gap as,
yi;gt = y
i
t   yi;nt (114)
= byit   byi;nt (115)
With exible prices and wages we have mci;nt =  it . Substituting into the
expression for mcit implies,
yi;nt = a
i
t + g
i;n
t =(1 + ') + (v + ln(1  )  ln(it))=(1 + ') (116)
Substituting this into the Phillips curve gives,
i;t = Etfi;t+1g+ [(1 + ')yi;gt   gi;gt +

1   
i;g
t ] (117)
where bit = ln(it=) is the price mark-up shock and the tax gap as been dened
so as to eliminate the e¤ects of the mark-up shock on ination, 1  
i;n
t = 
i
t .
We can write (??) for gap variables as
yi;gt = y
i
t   yi;nt = Etfyi;gt+1g   (rt   Etfi;t+1g   ri;nt )  Etfgi;gt+1   gi;gt g (118)
where ri;nt = +Etfyi;nt+1 yi;nt g Etfgi;nt+1 gi;nt g. Note that, given (116), the real
natural rate of interest depends - like natural output - only on the productivity
shock, the steady-state levels of distortionary taxation and the optimal level of
government spending.
We also have the budget constraint in gap form,
(bbit   rt) = (bbit 1   i;t) + (Gi
B
i
1  i
i
+
W
i
N
i
B
i
)gi;gt
 (R  1)yi;gt  
W
i
N
i
B
i
((1 + ')(yi;gt ) +
1
1   
i;g
t )
 (R  1)ait +
W
i
N
i
B
i
it (119)
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where we have again used the denition 1  
i;n
t = t is the e¢ cient tax rate
which eliminates the costs imposed by uctuations in rmsdesired mark-up.
We can eliminate the term in the interest rate using the aggregate consumption
Euler equation for the union as a whole,
rt =  bct + Etfbct+1g+ Etft+1g (120)
Finally the evolution of national competitiveness can be written in gap form,
yi;gt = g
i;g
t +c
;g
t + 

t   i;t  ait +at (121)
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Appendix 6 - Derivation of Union and National
Welfare
The measure of welfare which we shall seek to approximate is based on an
aggregate of household utility,
lnCt +  lnGt   (Nt)
1+'
1 + '
(122)
The rst term can be expanded as
c = cn + cg (123)
= cn + 
Z 1
0
cg;jdj + (1  )(yg   gg) (124)
Before considering the second term we need to note the following general result
relating to second order approximations,
Yt   Y
Yt
= yt +
1
2
y2t + o

kak3

(125)
where o

kak3

represents terms that are of order higher than 3 in the bound
kakon the amplitude of the relevant shocks. This will be used in various places
in the derivation of welfare.
Now consider the second order approximation to the second term for an
individual household can be written as,
N1+'
1 + '
=
(Nn)1+'
1 + '
+ (Nn)1+'fng + 1
2
(1 + ')(ng)2g+ o

kak3

Now we need to relate the labour input gap to the output gap and a measure
of price dispersion. Aggregating the individual rmsdemand for labour yields,
N = (
Y
A
)
Z 1
0
(
PH(i)
PH
) di (126)
It can be shown that (see GM(2006))
ng = yg + ln[
Z 1
0
(
PH(i)
PH
) di] (127)
= yg +

2
varifpH(i)g+ o

kak3

(128)
so we can write
N1+'
1 + '
=
(Nn)1+'
1 + '
+ (Nn)1+'fyg + 1
2
(yg)2(1 + ')
+

2
varifpH(i)gg+ o

kak3

(129)
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The term in G can be expanded as
lnG = ln(
G
Y
) + yg + tip (130)
= ln(1  exp( g)) + yg + tip (131)
=
1  n
n
gg   1
2
1  n
(n)2
(gg)2 + yg + tip+ o

kak3

(132)
where n=Gn=Y n. We can then write
 lnGt =
1  n
n
lnGt (133)
= ggt  
1
2n
(ggt )
2 + yg + tip+ o

kak3

(134)
Using these expansions, individual utility can be written as
lnCt +  lnGt   N
1+'
t
1 + '
= cnt + 
Z 1
0
cg;jt dj + (1  )(ygt   ggt ) +
ggt  
1
2n
(ggt )
2 + yg (135)
 [ (N
n)1+'
1 + '
+ (Nn)1+'fygt +
1
2
(ygt )
2(1 + ')
+

2
varifpH;t(i)g] + tip+O[3]
Now, adding natural terms to tip and if we have an optimal subsidy, then
Nn = (1 + )
1
1+ (136)
so we can simplify this as
lnCt + t lnGt  
N1+'t
1 + '
= 
Z 1
0
cj;gt dj   (ygt   ggt ) 
1
2n
(ggt )
2
 (1 + )f1
2
(ygt )
2(1 + ') (137)
+

2
varifpH ; t(i)g+ tip+O[3]
Total individual welfare in country i is therefore given by
 i =
X
t=0
t[ (yi;gt   gi;gt ) + 
Z 1
0
cj;gt dj (138)
  (1 + )
2
((yi;gt )
2(1 + ') +
1

(gi;gt )
2 + varlfpi;t(l)g]
+tip+O[3]
utilising the fact that 1  GnY n = 1  n = 11+ :
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Woodford (2003, Chapter 6) shows thatX
tvarlfpi;t(l)g = 1

X
t2i;t (139)
where we use the expression of the sum to n terms of a geometric series to write,
 i =
X
t=0
t[ (yi;gt   gi;gt ) + 
Z 1
0
cj;gt dj (140)
  (1 + )
2
((yi;gt )
2(1 + ') +
1

(gi;gt )
2 +


2i;t]
+tip+ o

kak3

This can be written as,
	i =   (1 + )
2
1X
t=0
t[


2i;t + (1 + ')(y
i;g
t +

(1 + )(1 + ')
)2 +
1

(gi;gt  

(1 + ')(1 + )
)2]
+tip+ o

kak3

(141)
Notice that the expression for individual country welfare includes linear terms
which are not present in the description of union-wide welfare described below.
These arise from the desire of the national scal authority to raise their terms of
trade relative to their trading partners. In aggregate this cannot happen, and
so this desire is not reected in the union-wide welfare function. Integrating
over all economies, and utilisingZ 1
0
(yi;g   ci;g   gi;g)di = 0 (142)
we obtain
  =   (1 + )
2
X
t=0
t
Z 1
0
[


2i;t + (y
i;g
t )
2(1 + ') +
1

(gi;gt )
2]di+ tip+ o

kak3

(143)
Welfare is the sum of quadratic terms in ination (for both wages and prices),
the output gap and the government spending gap in each country.
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Appendix 7 - Matrix Representation of Model
(1)National Fiscal Policy Makers problem
The economy is described as,
x1t+1
Etx2t+1

= A

x1t
x2t

+But +

"t+1
0

(144)
where
xt =
h
yi;gt 1 g
i;g
t 1 bbit 1 ait fbt fyt  i;gt 1 i;t 1 ait 1 "t i;t i0
ut = [ g
i;g
t 
i;g
t ]
0 and the exogenous union-wide elements in the national econ-
omys problem are dened as,
fbt = rt   (1  )at
= ( c;gt + Etc;gt+1 + Ett+1)  (1  )at
and,
fyt = c
;g
t +a

t + 

t
A = A0 1A1 and B = A0 1B1 where
A0 =
2666666666666666664
1  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1=   1 + Nw
B
(1 + ')  ((1  )N
B
+ Nw
B
)  0 0 0 Nw
(1 )B 0 1= 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
(1 + ')   0 0 0 0  (1 ) 0 0 0 
3777777777777777775
,
A1 =
266666666666666664
1  1 0  1 0 1 0 0 1 0  1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0  1
0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
377777777777777775
B1 =
266666666666666664
0 0
1 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 1
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
377777777777777775
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The policy makers objectives can be written as,
J0 = E0
1X
t=0
t[x
0
tQxt + 2x
0
tUut + u
0
tRut] (145)
where Q = (1+')A01A1+(
1
 )A
0
2A2+
"
A
0
8A8 , U = (1+')A
0
1B1+(
1
 )A
0
2B2+
"
A
0
8B8, and R = (1 + ')B
0
1B1 + (
1
 )B
0
2B2 +
"
B
0
8B8 where Aj is the jth row
of A.
(2)Monetary Leadership
The union-wide economy is described as,
x1t+1
Etx2t+1

= A

x1t
x2t

+But +

"t+1
0

(146)
where
xt =
h
y;gt 1 g
;g
t 1 bbt 1 at ;gt 1 t 1 at 1 "t t ct i0
and ut = [rt]0. The transition matrices are dened as A = A0 1A1 and
B = A0 1B1 where
A0 =
266666666666666664
1  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0  F1;5  F1;5
1=   1
+ Nw
B
(1 + ')
 ((1  )N
B
+ Nw
B
)  0 Nw
(1 )B 0
   
  1 + 1
0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0  F2;5  F2;5
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
(1 + ')   0 0  (1 ) 0 0 0  0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
377777777777777775
,
A1 =
26666666666666666664
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
F1;1
 F1;6
F1;2
+F1;6
F1;3
F1;4 + F1;6
+(1  )F1;5 F1;7 F1;8
F1;9
 F1;6 F1;10 F1;6
F1;6
 F1;5
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0  1 0
0 0 0  0 0 0 1 0 0
F2;1
 F2;6
F2;2
+F2;6
F2;3
F2;4 + F2;6
+(1  )F2;5 F2;7 F2;8
F2;9
 F2;6 F2;10 F2;6
F2;6
 F2;5
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
37777777777777777775
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B1 =
2666666666666664
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
1
3777777777777775
where Fi;j is an element of the solution from the national scal
authoritiespolicy problem, ut = Fx1t. In other words the ECBs description
of the economy includes the aggregate of the national scal behaviour.
The policy maker objectives can be written as,
J0 = E0
1X
t=0
t[x
0
tQxt + 2x
0
tUut + u
0
tRut] (147)
whereQecb = (1+')A01A1+(
1
 )A
0
2A2+
"
A
0
6A6 , U = (1+')A
0
1B1+(
1
 )A
0
2B2+
"
A
0
6B6, and R = (1 + ')B
0
1B1 + (
1
 )B
0
2B2 +
"
B
0
6B6 where Aj is the jth row
of A.
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Figures
Figure 1: National Fiscal Response to a 1% Idiosyncratic Debt Shock.
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Figure 2: Nationnal Fiscal Response to an Idiosyncratic Debt Shock - EMU
case (red line), Flex Exchange Rates (green dashed line).
39
Figure 3: Half-life of National Debt as a Function of Price Stickiness and Steady-
State Debt.
40
Figure 4: Competitiveness and the National Fiscal Response - Debt Shock Only
(red line), Debt and Competitiveness Shock (blue dots), Competitiveness Shock
Only (green dashed line).
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Figure 5: ECBs Response to a Union-Wide Debt Shock under Commitment
(dashed line) and Discretion (solid line).
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Figure 6: Conventional Assignment: ECB Ignores National Fiscal Policy under
Commitment (dashed line) and Discretion (solid line).
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Figure 7: ECBs Time-Consistent Response to a Union-Wide Debt Shock*
*Notes to Figure - Debt-Gdp ratio is 15% (green dashed line), 50% (red
triangles) and 80% (solid blue line).
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